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Abstract. Commonsense reasoning has long been considered as one of
the holy grails of artificial intelligence. Most of the recent progress in the
field has been achieved by novel machine learning algorithms for natu-
ral language processing. However, without incorporating logical reason-
ing, these algorithms remain arguably shallow. With some notable ex-
ceptions, developers of practical automated logic-based reasoners have
mostly avoided focusing on the problem. The paper argues that the
methods and algorithms used by existing automated reasoners for clas-
sical first-order logic can be extended towards commonsense reasoning.
Instead of devising new specialized logics we propose a framework of
extensions to the mainstream resolution-based search methods to make
these capable of performing search tasks for practical commonsense rea-
soning with reasonable efficiency. The proposed extensions mostly rely
on operating on ordinary proof trees and are devised to handle com-
monsense knowledge bases containing inconsistencies, default rules, tax-
onomies, topics, relevance, confidence and similarity measures. We claim
that machine learning is best suited for the construction of common-
sense knowledge bases while the extended logic-based methods would be
well-suited for actually answering queries from these knowledge bases.
Keywords: Automated reasoning · Commonsense reasoning · Resolu-
tion method · Natural language processing.
1 Introduction
Ability to perform “commonsense reasoning” (CSR) has been considered one of
the big goals of Artificial Intelligence (AI) for a very long time. One of the first
papers [1] introducing the term comes from John McCarthy already at 1958.
The exact meaning of CSR is – perhaps necessarily so – vague. Wikipedia [2]
states, following [4]: “Commonsense reasoning is one of the branches of artificial
intelligence (AI) that is concerned with simulating the human ability to make
presumptions about the type and essence of ordinary situations they encounter
every day. These assumptions include judgments about the physical properties,
purpose, intentions and behavior of people and objects, as well as possible out-
comes of their actions and interactions.”
Inevitably, performing CSR requires having access to “commonsense knowl-
edge” described in Wikipedia [3] as “In artificial intelligence research, common-
sense knowledge consists of facts about the everyday world, such as ’Lemons are
sour’, that all humans are expected to know. It is currently an unsolved problem
in Artificial General Intelligence ...”
Due to its importance and a long-standing history, there is a large body of
research devoted to both designing algorithms and specialized logics for CSR
as well as building commonsense knowledge bases. While we have seen signifi-
cant progress and popularity of AI in the last decade, mostly due to progress
in Machine Learning (ML), the progress in CSR has been slow and no major
breakthroughs have arguably been achieved. Citing [4]: “AI has seen great ad-
vances of many kinds recently, but there is one critical area where progress has
been extremely slow: ordinary commonsense” and O.Etzioni, the CEO of the
Allen Institute for AI [7]: “No AI system currently deployed can reliably answer
a broad range of simple questions such as: If I put my socks in a drawer, will
they still be in there tomorrow? or How can you tell a milk carton is full? For
example, when AlphaGo beat the number one Go player in the world in 2016,
the program did not know that Go is a board game.”
The current paper is driven by a goal to build hybrid systems which comple-
ment the current machine learning systems for natural language with logic-based
reasoning systems specialized for CSR. We will present the GROK framework
for extending the existing algoritms and systems of classical first order reasoning
to CSR capabilities.
2 Current approaches
The specific CSR task targeted by the current paper is question answering: given
either a knowledge base of facts and rules or a large corpora of texts (or both),
plus optionally a situation description (assumptions) for the questions, answer
questions posed either in logic or natural language. A simple often-used example
with inherently given choices is: given the assumption “The trophy would not
fit in the brown suitcase because it was too big”, answer “What was too big?”.
An example of an open-ended question would be “Which birds cannot fly?”.
The current approaches to CSR can be broadly classified as based on either
logical reasoning or machine learning (ML) on a large corpora of natural language
texts.
The main successes have been achieved relatively recently with the ML sys-
tems targeting question answering in natural language (more details are given
in the later benchmarks chapter). A core method for ML approaches is to build
a prediction system using ML techniques, which, given an input text, predicts
the next or missing word or phrase. The most prominent current underlying
system is BERT [6] from Google AI, with a number of specialised systems built
on BERT.
Historically, the longest-going CSR project has been the logic-based CYC
project, already in 1985 [19] stating the focus on CSR. The CYC project has
created a largest known manually made commonsense knowledge base along
with reasoners specially built for this knowledge base. Parts of the knowledge
base – OpenCyc – are available as a large FOL axiom set [33] in the TPTP [35]
problem set for automated reasoning. Despite several successes, the approach
taken in the CYC project has often been viewed as problematic ([20], [28]) and
has been repeatedly used as an argument against logic-based methods in CSR.
We note that the CYC deduction problems in TPTP remain relatively hard
for top-of-the-line automated reasoners, mostly due to little focus on CYC-
specific proof search heuristics. However, the paper [21] introduced the SInE
method for handling large theories, which has been later implemented by sev-
eral automated reasoning systems and significantly enhances their efficiency for
large knowledge bases. A recent paper [22] reports important experimental gains
from combining SInE with the methods from [47]. For a concrete architecture
for reasoning with large theories see [23]. A overview of methods geared towards
the similar goal is given in the paper [24].
CYC is not the sole current system for logic-based CSR. The papers [8] [9]
and [10] describe research and experiments with a system for natural language
question answering, converting natural language sentences to logic and then per-
forming proof search, using different existing FOL knowledge bases. The authors
note a number of difficulties, with the most crucial being the lack of sufficiently
rich FOL knowledge bases.
Due to the arguably shallow nature of current pure ML approaches, there is
growing interest in building hybrid systems, composing both ML and symbolic
reasoning systems, both in the natural language and image recognition areas:
see the paper [11] for an overview of the current work in the area. “Symbolic
reasoning” in this context is a vague term, sometimes, but not always, meaning
“logic-based systems”. The paper [12] describes a system obtaining new state-
of-the-art results on three classic commonsense reasoning tasks. It consists of
two component models, a masked language model and a deep semantic simi-
larity model using unsupervised deep structured semantic models of [13], thus
employing symbolic reasoning only in a fairly shallow way. In the last paper the
authors note that the previous example question “The trophy would not fit in
the brown suitcase because it was too big. What was too big?” still cannot be
satisfactorily answered.
3 Benchmarks for Question Answering
An important question for research in CSR is the issue of measurable bench-
marks. The main benchmark set TPTP [35] for Automated Reasoning (AR)
contains a relatively small subcategory for CSR problems in FOL.
Largely due to the progress in Natural Language Processing (NLP) achieved
by ML systems, a number of natural language question answering benchmarks
have been built and proposed in recent years. There is significant controversy
around the “gameability” and superficial methods being sufficient for perform-
ing well on some of these benchmarks. Newer benchmarks attempt to focus on
questions which require deeper understanding.
[16] presents the SuperGlue benchmark, parts of which target question an-
swering. An example with a binary choice question: “Premise: My body cast a
shadow over the grass. Question: Whats the CAUSE for this? Alternative 1: The
sun was rising. Alternative 2: The grass was cut.. For these kinds of questions
the authors note that the best of their systems, BERT++, achieved ca 74%
accuracy, while people achieved 100%.
[18] presents the ARC benchmark containing grade-school level, multiple-
choice science questions, assembled to encourage research in advanced question-
answering. The current leader of the ARC public leaderboard is the FreeLB-
RoBERTa (single model) system, with the accuracy 68% and several BERT-
based systems following closely.
[17] presents a natural-language based dataset OpenBookQA for Open Book
Question Answering. An example question from OpenBookQA: “Which of these
would let the most heat travel through?”
– a new pair of jeans.
– a steel spoon in a cafeteria.
– a cotton candy at a store.
– a calvin klein cotton hat.
Answering the question requires using the given science fact “Metal is a thermal
conductor” and common knowledge expected to be present or derived from the
knowledge base of the measured system: “Steel is made of metal. Heat travels
through a thermal conductor.” The current public leaderboard for OpenBookQA
has the system AristoRoBERTaV7 of the authors achieving best performance:
78% accuracy.
[5] presents a new natural language benchmark set and evaluates it for five
top-of-the-line language models for question answering. As an example we bring
two challenges from the set, for which none of the tested systems managed to
give a satisfactory answer:
– “There are six frogs on the log. Two leave, but three join. The number of
frogs on the log is now? Answer: seven.’
– “Yesterday I dropped my clothes at the dry cleaners and have yet to pick
them off. Where are my clothes? Answer: at the dry cleaners.”
[5] summarizes the findings thus: “large-scale language models do a good job
of figuring the topic under consideration, and what the plausible set of masked
words / continuations might be, given the input context. But a poor job of
reasoning about which specific response is the right one.”
4 Integrating machine learning for NLP with logic-based
reasoning
The hybrid question-answering algorithm we strive towards will
– Use common ML-based methods for
• determining the context of the question in the form of a set of tag/relevance
measure pairs,
• parsing the input assumptions and the question to a logic-based formal
representation,
• proposing a set of candidate answers along with their confidence mea-
sures.
– Use the common sense reasoning engine and a common sense knowledge base
(CSKB) for
• updating the confidence of candidate answers,
• proposing new candidate answers along with their confidence measures,
• providing derivations of the answers/confidences.
– Use a special converter to present the logic-based derivations in natural
language as explanations of answers given.
The common sense reasoner should use the context tag/relevance measures
provided by the ML component for
– updating the confidence measures of clauses in CSKB for the context of the
questions (this would be similar, but more fine-grained than CYC topics, see
[33]),
– heuristic preference of clauses likely relevant to the question (see [10] for
relevant research).
The crucial questions out of the scope of this paper are: (a) how to represent
knowledge in the CSKB, (b) how to convert natural language sentences to a
logic-based formalism and (c) how to build a suitable CSKB. These questions
are interrelated and have been an area of active research for decades.
One of the original goals of the CYC project [19] was automating knowledge
acquisition from natural language texts in order to build a comprehensive, ever-
growing CSKB. This turned out to be harder than expected, thus the CYC base
was written mostly by people, arguably leading to brittleness. Given the recent
successes of ML in NLP, the possibility of automating CSKB building from, say,
Wikipedia texts, has been under consideration by several research groups.
There are several currently available large knowledge bases built for and
used by both NLP and CSR research, like WordNet, ConceptNet, NELL, Yago,
DBpedia and OpenCyc. They use different formalisms and have widely different
aims and contents. Our initial investigations of these knowledge bases indicate
that they do not, for the large part, contain the most basic knowledge we would
expect a small child to know. For example, we have not found evidence from
these knowledge bases for deriving classical default reasoning examples that
objects typically do not fly, but birds fly, while dead birds and penguins do not
fly. Similarly, basic information about the human relatives seems to be mostly
missing. Instead, the bulk of information is comprised of either detailed factual
knowledge about actual people, places and events or a semi-random selection of
simple ontology rules for a very wide variety of concepts. Clearly, the task of
building a CSKB covering a significant percentage of the knowledge of a small
child is still open.
We consider it likely that it is extremely hard to build a logic-based CSKB
without having access to a practically usable and efficient common sense reason-
ing engine: a chicken-and-egg problem.
5 GROK extension framework for reasoning with CSR
In the following we propose the GROK (Graph Reasoning On commonsense
Knowledge) framework of extensions to the mainstream resolution-based search
methods to make these capable of performing search tasks for practical common-
sense reasoning with reasonable efficiency. We expect that the same framework
can be adapted to search methods different from resolution,
The intuition behind GROK is preserving first order classical logic (FOL)
intact as an underlying machinery for derivations in CSR. The core methods of
automated reasoning used by most of the high-performance automated reasoning
systems (in particular, the resolution method) remain usable as core methods for
CSR. Essentially, FOL with the resolution method produces all combinations of
derivable true sentences modulo obvious simplifications like subsumption. The
main difference from strict FOL and GROK extensions stands in the handling
of constructed proof trees, which are evaluated using various heuristic functions,
estimating their relevance and confidence. The outcome of a GROK reasoner
is a set of FOL proofs with these measures added. The actual use of measures
in applications boils down to the criteria for accepting or not accepting the
derivations with measures under the application-specific limits.
While the proposed framework is focused on efficient proof search, we will
not discuss or propose useful modifications to algorithms and heuristics of the
resolution method crucial for efficiency, like subsumption, clause ordering and
clause selection. The specialization of these algorithms for CSR reasoning is left
out of the scope of the paper due to size limits.
5.1 Resolution method
In the following we will assume that the underlying first order reasoner uses
the resolution method, see [25] for details or Wikipedia page [26] for a quick
overview. The rest of the paper assumes familiarity with the main concepts,
terminology and algorithms of the resolution method.
We treat the resolution method as a combinatorial search algorithm providing
all possible derivations for the questions posed. On top of these we will add
additional filters and measures, eliminating some derivations and calculating
confidences and signs for answers by additional operations on the derivations
found.
5.2 Queries and answers
We assume the question posed is in one of two forms:
– Is the statement Q true?
– Find values V for existentially bound variables in Q so that Q is true.
For simplicity’s sake we will assume that the statement Q is in the prefix
form, i.e. no quantifiers occur in the scope of other logical connectives.
In the second case there could be several different assignment vectors to
the variables, essentially giving different answers. We also note that the answer
could be a disjunction, giving possible options, but not a single definite answer.
However, as shown in [27], in case a single definite answer exists, it will be
derived.
A widely used machinery in resolution theorem provers for extracting val-
ues of existentially bound variables in Q is to use a special answer predicate,
converting a question statement Q to a formula
∃X1, ..., ∃Xn(Q(X1, ..., Xn)&¬answer(X1, ..., Xn))
for existentially quantified variables in Q. Whenever a clause is derived which
consists of only answer predicates, it is treated as a contradiction (essentially,
answer) and the arguments of the answer predicate are returned as the values
looked for. A common convention is to call such clauses answer clauses. We will
require that the proof search does not stop whenever an answer clause is found,
but will continue to look for new answer clauses until the predetermined time
limit is reached. Generally there is no guarantee that all the answer clauses (or
any answer clause) will be found in the given time limit. See [34] for a framework
of extracting multiple answers.
We also assume the queries take a general form
(CSKB&A)⇒ Q
where CSKB is a commonsense knowledge base, A is an optional set of pre-
condition statements for this particular question and Q is a question statement.
Despite the fact that one could use a complex question statement A⇒ Q instead
of a separate precondition and query statement, or consider A to be a part of
CSKB, it is useful to distinguish these. We note that the same distinction is
made in a significant proportion of FOL problems in TPTP [29].
Since we assume the use of the resolution method for proof search, the whole
general query form is negated and converted to clauses, i.e. disjunctions of literals
(positive or negative atoms). We will call the clauses stemming from the question
statement question clauses.
For better readability we will present most of the disjunctions as implications.
We will use single upper-case letters for universally quantified variables and
words starting with lower-case letters for constants and predicate symbols.
The following is a simple example of the assumed structure, where the first
two clauses comprise the CSKB, the third to fifth clauses stem from the pre-
condition statement and the last clause is a question clause stemming from the
question statement ∃Xfast(X) with the answer predicate added.
bird(X) => canfly(X)
canfly(X) => fast(X)
bird(tweety)
bird(fleepy)
bird(creepy) V bird(bleepy)
fast(X) => answer(X)
Three different answer clauses can be derived from this example:
answer(tweety)
answer(fleepy)
answer(creepy) V answer(bleepy)
5.3 Inconsistencies
We expect any CSKB with a nontrivial structure to contain inconsistencies in the
sense that a contradiction can be derived from the CSKB. Looking at existing
CSKB-s mentioned earlier, we observe that either they are already inconsistent
(for example, the FOL version of OpenCyc [33] in TPTP [29] is inconsistent)
or would become inconsistent in case intuitively valid inequalities are added, for
example, inequalities of classes like “a cat is not a dog”, “a male is not a female”
or default rules like “birds can fly”, “dead birds cannot fly”, “penguins cannot
fly”. We note that several large existing CSKB-s do not contain such inequalities
explicitly, although they are necessary for nontrivial question answering.
Since classical FOL allows to derive anything from a contradiction, it is
clearly unsuitable for serious CSKB-s. There are two possible ways of overcoming
the issue: either (a) use some version of relevance logic [37] or other paracon-
sistent logics or (b) define a filter for eliminating irrelevant classical proofs. We
argue that despite a lot of theoretical work in the area, little work has been done
in actual automated proving for relevance logic, thus using it directly is likely to
create significant complexities. Instead we introduce a simple relevance filter:
Definition 1 (Relevance filter). A resolution derivation of a contradiction
not containing any answer clauses is discarded.
Since a standard resolution derivation of a contradiction does not lead to any
further derivations, this filter is completeness preserving in the sense of finding
all resolution derivations containing an answer clause.
5.4 Confidence
Most, if not all of the commonsense knowledge is uncertain and in most cases
uncertainty cannot be adequately measured in practice. At the same time our
practical experience gives us an intuitive rough understanding of the distribution
of these uncertainties.
Reasoning under uncertainty has been thoroughly investigated for at least
a century, leading to a proliferation of different theories and mechanisms (see,
for example [40] and [41] ), each of which is well suited for certain kinds of
problems and ill-suited for other kinds. The underlying reason of proliferation is
the philosophical complexity of interpreting probability: see [38] for an overview.
We claim that there is no universal and widely accepted theory or methodol-
ogy for handling uncertainty in reasoning. Davis argues in [32] that probabilistic
models are not suitable for automated reasoning or plausible for cognitive mod-
els. We also note that ML systems use confidence measures pervasively in the
internal calculations and output results, yet most researchers avoid associating
these measures with any concrete philosophical approach or mathematical the-
ory. Yann LeCun in [39] says “I am perfectly ready to throw probability theory
under a bus”.
Philosophically we largely follow the subjective interpretation of probability
as a degree of belief, originating from Ramsey and later systematized by Bruno
De Finetti. We use the word confidence to denote our rough adherence to this
interpretation. We avoid using complex measures like intervals, distributions or
fuzzy functions.
More concretely, we take the approach of (a) providing a simple sensible
baseline algorithm and (b) leaving open ways to modify this algorithm for specific
cases as need arises.
We will use a single rational number in the range 0...1 as a measure of a
confidence of a clause, with 1 standing for perfect confidence and 0 standing for
no information. Confidence of a clause not holding is encoded as a confidence
of the negation of the clause. For any given clause C we could, for example,
ask a number of people a question “what is your degree of belief that C holds,
from −1 for certainty that C does not hold to 1 for certainty that C does hold”,
calculate the average answer c and store the absolute value of c as a confidence
of C or ¬C, depending on the polarity of c. In practice we expect that an ML
system employed in the construction of a CSKB would provide us confidence
measures without any clear indication of how or why exactly these measures
were calculated.
As a baseline we use the arguably simplest approach of computing uncertain-
ties of derived clauses: multiplying confidences of statements under assumption
that they are independent, stemming from the Bayes’ theorem as P (A ∧ B) =
P (A) ∗ P (B|A).
Definition 2 (Confidence calculation for resolution steps). For binary
resolution and paramodulation steps the confidence of a result is obtained by
multiplying the confidences of the premisses. For the factorization step the con-
fidence of the result is the confidence of the premise, unchanged. The question
clauses have confidence 1.
We can argue that possible dependence of the premisses could be taken into
account, exactly as in the following section for cumulative evidence. However,
here we prefer to err on the conservative side, i.e. assuming the independence of
the premisses.
A simple example employing forward reasoning, concretely, negative ordered
resolution:
bird(tweety): 0.8
bird(X) => canfly(X): 0.9
canfly(X) => fast(X): 0.7
fast(X) => answer(X): 1
leads to a sequential derivation of
canfly(tweety): 0.72
fast(tweety): 0.504
answer(tweety): 0.504
We will now look at the situation with additional evidence for the derived
answer. In our context, using additional evidence is possible if a clause C can
be derived in different ways, giving two different derivations d1 and d2 with
confidences c1 and c2. In case the derivations d1 and d2 are independent, we
could apply the Bayes theorem as P (A ∨ B) = P (A) + P (B) − P (A ∧ B) to
calculate the cumulative confidence.
What would it mean for derivations to be “independent”? In the context
of commonsense reasoning we cannot expect to have an exact measure of in-
dependence. However, suppose the derivations d1 and d2 consist of exactly the
same initial clauses, but used in a different order. In this case c1 = c2 and the
cumulative confidence should intuitively be also just c1: no additional evidence
is provided. On the other hand, in case the non-question input clauses of d1
are d2 are mutually disjoint, then - assuming all the input clauses are mutually
independent - the derivations are also independent, and we should apply the
previous rule for P (A ∨B) for computing the cumulative confidence.
We will estimate the independence i of two derivations d1 and d2 simply as
one minus the ratio of shared input clauses to the total number of input clauses
in d1 and d2. Thus, if no clauses are shared between d1 and d2, then i = 1 and
if all the clauses are shared, then i = 0.
In addition, we also know that it is highly unlikely that all the input clauses
are mutually independent. Again, lacking a realistic way to calculate the depen-
dencies, we can simply give a heuristic estimate h in the range 0...1 to the overall
independence of the input clause set, where 1 stands for total independence and
0 for total dependence. The heuristic estimate can be viewed as our measure of
optimism about the overall indepedence.
Finally, we will calculate the overall independence of two derivations d1 and
d2 as i ∗ h. We will use the combination of these two independence measures in
the following rule in a somewhat ad-hoc manner as follows.
Definition 3 (Confidence calculation for cumulative evidence). Given
two derivations d1 and d2 of the search result C with confidences c1 and c2,
calculate the updated confidence of C as
max(c1 + c2 ∗ i ∗ h− (c1 ∗ c2 ∗ i ∗ h), c1 ∗ i ∗ h+ c2 − (c1 ∗ c2 ∗ i ∗ h))
where
– i is one minus the number of shared non-question input clauses in d1 and d2
divided by the total number of non-question input clauses in d1 and d2,
– h is the heuristic estimate of the independence of the total set of input clauses
from 1 for total independence to 0 for total dependence.
Despite the ad hoc nature of the usage of i and h, the formula satisfies the
following intuitive requirements for cumulative evidence:
– If d1 and d2 do not share non-question input clauses and the total set of
input clauses is mutually independent, i ∗ h = 1 and the formula degrades
to c1 + c2 − (c1 ∗ c2).
– If d1 and d2 have the same non-question input clauses or the total set of input
clauses is mutually totally dependent, i ∗ h = 0 and the formula degrades to
max(c1, c2).
As an example, let us consider new input clauses and another way to derive
the same answer:
inair(tweety): 0.8
inair(X) => fast(X): 0.9
fast(X) => answer(X): 1
leads to a sequential derivation of
fast(tweety): 0.72
answer(tweety): 0.72
We observe that the sets of non-question clauses in the derivations are dif-
ferent, thus i = 1. If the total heuristic independence measure h = 1, we get the
cumulative confidence 0.504 + 0.72 − (0.504 ∗ 0.72) = 0.86112. Setting h = 0.5
leads to
max(0.504 + 0.72 ∗ 0.5− (0.504 ∗ 0.72 ∗ 0.5),
0.504 ∗ 0.5 + 0.72− (0.504 ∗ 0.72 ∗ 0.5)) =
max(0.68256, 0.79056) =
0.79056
We note that one could use a different formula for calculating the cumulative
confidence. For example, the confidences of clauses could be taken into account
while computing the independence measure i. However, we argue that the pre-
viously given intuitive requirements should be followed.
Next, consider the question of whether we should calculate the cumulative
confidence for all the clauses derived, not just the answer clauses, as done in
our framework. It is an interesting separate problem to determine under which
conditions the results for the answer clauses would be same for both approaches,
and we will not tackle it here. However, we argue that
– the inexactness of confidence measures is likely to dominate over the differ-
ences possibly surfacing for different approaches or for minor modifications
of the given formula,
– it is more efficient to calculate the cumulative confidence of the answer
clauses as opposed to calculating these for all the clauses in the derivation:
the latter would both require additional search and would raise the question
as for how to cumulate confidences of inequal, but subsuming clauses.
Observe that neither the overall set nor the structure of derivations depends
on the confidence measures; the forthcoming parts of our framework keep this
property. Suppose that we have two different derivations d1 and d2 which lead to
the same answer, but share an intermediate derived clause C. In our framework
the confidence measure of C is used for computing the confidence of the answers
before the cumulative evidence rule is used.
5.5 Collecting negative evidence
Since we assume that the CSKB can be inconsistent and we use the previously
described relevance filter for eliminating derivations not containing clauses stem-
ming from the query, we must consider the possibility that both the query and
the negation of the query could be derivable.
Thus, we conduct additional proof search for the negations of the previously
assumed two types of questions Q:
– If Q contains no existentially quantified variables, is the statement ¬Q true?
– For all i vectors of values C1i, ..., Cni found for existentially bound variables
X1, ...Xn in Q making Q true, is ¬Q true when we substitute the values in
C1i, ..., Cni for corresponding variables in Q?
The proof tasks are created by clausifying the corresponding negated and
substituted-into questions along with the CSKB and precondition statements.
The overall algorithm for question answering is as follows:
Assuming we have a given amount of time t and the coefficient c in 0...1 for
the proof search for Q, conduct the search as follows:
1. Spend t ∗ c for proof search for Q, possibly generating several derivations
with i different value vectors for existentially quantified variables in Q.
2. Compute the cumulative confidences for answers with i different value vec-
tors.
3. Spend t ∗ (1 − c) for finding answers to ¬Q(C1i, ..., Cni), iterating over i
different value vectors found in the first step. Each iteration is a full stand-
alone resolution search possibly leading to several derivations.
4. Compute the cumulative confidences for answers with different negative
value vectors collected in the last step.
5. Compute the sign and the overall confidence for different value vectors found
in the first step.
6. For the existential-variable-free question Q return the answer true or false
along with the overall confidence and relevant derivation trees. For the case
with variables, return only positive answers along with the confidence and
relevant derivation trees.
For sign and overall confidence calculation we employ the following simple
rule subtracting the negative confidence from the positive confidence:
Definition 4 (Sign and confidence calculation for combined positive
and negative evidence). Given a question Q and the vector of values C1, ..., Cn
for the existentially quantified variables in Q, calculate cp − cn where cp is the
cumulative confidence for the positive answer and cn is the cumulative confidence
for the negative answer. If cp−cn < 0, the answer is negative with the confidence
0− (cp− cn), otherwise the answer is positive with the confidence cp− cn.
5.6 Default rules
In addition to the observation that most of the common sense rules and facts
are uncertain, we also know that a large subset of these rules can be considered
to be “default”: in the absence of contradictory evidence to the result of the
application of the rule we should assume the rule is true, while contradictory
evidence should block the application of the rule. A famous “penguin example”
is as follows:
bird(tweety)
penguin(pengu)
penguin(X) => bird(X)
bird(X) => canfly(X)
penguin(X) => -canfly(X)
We should use the bird-can-fly rule to derive that tweety can fly, while we
should not use the same rule to derive that pengu can fly, although we have
penguin-is-a-bird rule. Moreover, we intuitively expect that we should derive
that penguin cannot fly, despite the obvious contradiction.
Another famous example is the “Nixon triangle”, the most common so-called
“cautious” interpretation of which is that we should neither derive that Nixon
is a pacifist nor that he is not a pacifist:
quaker(nixon)
republican(nixon)
quaker(X) => pacifist(X)
republican(X) => -pacifist(X)
Default logic, proposed by R.Reiter in [30] has been one of the leading and
most researched contenders for handling default rules. Default logic, along with
autoepistemic logic and McCarthy’s circumscription method belongs to a family
of nonmonotonic logics [31]: differently from classical logic, a derivation in non-
monotonic logic can block or invalidate another derivation. A similar approach is
taken with a Closed World Assumption where a negation ¬A of any not derivable
statement A is considered to be true.
The fundamental difference from the confidences analyzed before is that such
confidence calculations cannot normally capture the intuitive expectations we
have with the default rules. For example, we have no grounds to state that the
bird-can-fly rule has much higher or much lower confidence than the penguin-
cannot-fly rule. Additionally we observe that the default rules are often associ-
ated with multi-level hiearchies like
penguin(X) => bird(X)
bird => materialobject(X)
materialobject => -canfly(X)
bird(X) => canfly(X)
penguin(X) => -canfly(X)
There are two major problems in the application of default rules. First, how
to prioritize rules, second, how to perform search efficiently. A naive algorithm
would have to perform full, potentially nonterminating sub-search for a blocking
contradiction for each derivation step. So far the practical reasoning systems
dealing with default logic have originated from the answer set programming
paradigm, employing propositional solvers on top of grounded first order logic
formulas: see the overview paper [44].
We will follow an important observation made in a number of papers concern-
ing default logic see e.g. [43] and [42]: we should prioritize the more specific rules
over more general rules. Here the “generality” is normally meant to indicate the
layer of a taxonomoy hierarchy to which the rule is applicable. In the example
above the first two rules are absolutely certain taxonomy rules defining more and
more abstract concepts penguin - bird - materialobject, not uncertain observa-
tional rules. The underlying intuition is that our confidence that a certain bird
can fly should be considered not as a fixed number, but strongly dependent on
what kind of bird we have. Statistically it is indeed true that almost all (alive)
birds can fly, while it is also true that none or almost none of the penguins can
fly. The crux of the observation is that the small set of non-flying birds is not
evenly spread over all kinds of birds, but heavily represented with penguins.
The approach we take regarding default rules is to identify and annotate
the taxonomy rules in the CSKB as such and then use the intuition above to
discard derivations where a more general default rule application is contradicted
with a less general application. Our current intuition is that all the rules with
confidence below 1 should be treated as default rules.
We tackle the efficiency problem by not performing sub-searches for blockers.
Instead, we check each derivation of the answer for blockers, expecting that
derivable blockers may have been derived during search and be already present
in the set of derived clauses. The more time we give for search, the more likely
the latter is to happen. In other words, more time given to a search may result
in fewer unblocked derivations of answers.
The following rough ad-hoc algorithm captures both of the basic intuitions
described above. Since we do not perform blocking during search, when given
unbounded time and resources, all the derivations, hence also all blockers, will
be found. The algorithm is conservative in the following sense: it may block more
derivations than we would intuitively like. It is an important research task to
investigate further improvements to the algorithm to make it less conservative; in
particular, instead of simply counting the number of taxonomy rule applications
to measure specificity, we could perform a more fine-grained comparison.
Definition 5 (Default elimination algorithm). Treat the derivation trees
as directed acyclic graphs where each clause occurs only once. Observe that all
the clauses derived during search are sorted by their order of derivation and
clauses derived later cannot occur in the derivations of earlier clauses. Let d be
a derivation of an answer clause. By a “direct contradiction derivation of x”
we mean derivations with exactly n steps where n is the number of non-answer
literals in x: the motivation for looking for these is search speed.
– Mark all the clauses derived during search as unblocked.
– Iteratively apply the following blocking check over all the clauses Ci in the
derivation d, starting from the earlier clauses:
• Determine whether one of the parent clauses of Ci is a default rule.
• If yes, search for and loop over all the direct contradiction derivations
dc for Ci and some of the already derived and unblocked clauses in the
search space:
∗ If yes, determine whether the derivation dc of the direct contradiction
Ci contains a smaller number of taxonomy rules than the derivation
of Ci.
∗ If yes, determine whether the derivation dc cannot itself be invali-
dated by the default elimination algorithm,
∗ If it can, mark dc and all the derivations containing dc blocked, oth-
erwise mark Ci and all the derivations containing Ci as blocked and
break out of the current loop.
– Determine whether the final answer clause is blocked and if yes, discard the
derivation.
5.7 Similarities
An important part of CSR is reasoning by analogues and similarities. Similarity-
based reasoning in FOL has been researched before, see e.g. [45] and [46]. A
recent paper [48] describes an implementation of a neural guidance system for
saturation-style automated theorem provers.
In the simplest cases we incorporate similarity-based reasoning by treating
similar predicates/functions/constants as equivalent or equal with a measure of
confidence approximated from the given similarity measure. For example, given
that kings are similar to queens with a measure s we create an implicit axiom
king(X) <=> queen(X), the confidence of which is calculated by a heuristic
algoritm from s. This allows the reasoner to produce derivations carrying the
knowledge associated with one kind of object over to similar kinds, but with
diminished confidence.
In case we additionally know that king(X) => male(X) and queen(X) =>
female(X) with confidence 1, we apply algorithms similar to the default rea-
soning described in the previous section. We will skip the details.
6 Summary and further work
We have presented a GROK framework for performing logic-based common sense
reasoning by building upon existing algorithms and systems for automated rea-
soning in classical first order logic. We argue that such symbolic AI methods
have a good perspective to complement machine learning systems and achieve
both deeper reasoning and explanatory capabilities than is possible with the
pure neural computation approach.
The described framework is currently in the implementation phase as a sys-
tem GK, containing a large set of extensions and modifications to the existing
automated reasoning system GKC of the author: [47], [49]. The efficiency-focused
modifications to the common algorithms and heuristics like subsumption, literal
and clause selection in the CSR context will be covered in future papers.
We see both the practical experiments with the reasoners and the buildup and
integration of commonsense knowledge bases with the help of machine learning
systems as the main driver of future research. The GROK framework covers a
number of important, well-known themes in AI, all of which can and should be
investigated further from the practical standpoint of creating systems enhancing
the quality and performance of NLP question answering.
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